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Abstract
Although early research implicated the amygdala in automatic 
processing of  negative information, more recent research sug-
gests that it plays a more general role in processing the motiva-
tional relevance of  various stimuli, suggesting that the relation 
between valence and amygdala activation may depend on con-
textual goals. This study provides experimental evidence that the 
relation between valence and amygdala activity is dynamically 
modulated by evaluative goals. During functional magnetic res-
onance imaging, participants evaluated the positive, negative, or 
overall (positive plus negative) aspects of  famous people. When 
participants were providing overall evaluations, both positive and 
negative names were associated with amygdala activation. When 
they were evaluating positivity, positive names were associated 
with amygdala activity, and when they were evaluating negativ-
ity, negative names were associated with amygdala activity. Evi-
dence for a negativity bias was found; modulation was more pro-
nounced for positive than for negative information. These data 
suggest that the amygdala flexibly processes motivationally rele-
vant evaluative information in accordance with current process-
ing goals, but processes negative information less flexibly than 
positive information. 
Successfully navigating complex environments requires 
quick evaluative processes to determine the relative value 
of  stimuli in the context of  situational demands. Recent re-
search has begun to illustrate the important cognitive and 
affective neural processes involved in disambiguating the 
evaluative connotations of  stimuli and preparing the body 
for action. Convergent evidence across methodologies sug-
gests that the amygdala is particularly relevant for encoding 
and processing the affective properties of  stimuli (Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, 
& Cahill, 2000; LeDoux, 2000). Although it is clear that 
the amygdala plays an important role in evaluation (Cun-
ningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), decision making (Hsu, 
Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005), and social cog-
nition (Adolphs, 2003), the precise operating characteris-
tics of  this region remain unclear. 
Initial research suggested that the amygdala is specifi-
cally involved in detecting threatening stimuli (Isenberg et 
al., 1999; LeDoux, 2000; Morris et al., 1996), or is more 
generally engaged in processing negativity (Cunningham, 
Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Hariri, Tessitore, 
Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002). This valence-specific 
conceptualization has been called into question by studies 
showing that positive, like negative, stimuli evoke greater 
amygdala activity than neutral stimuli (Breiter et al., 2003; 
Hamann, Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002). Moreover, studies 
that have independently manipulated valence and intensity 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003), or used statisti-
cal methods to separate the contributions of  the two (Cun-
ningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), have provided evidence 
that amygdala activity appears to be more associated with 
processing affective intensity than with processing any par-
ticular valence. These studies have been critical in recon-
ceptualizing amygdala function from one of  threat detec-
tion to one of  more general vigilance for motivationally 
relevant stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Whalen, 1998). 
Although it is clear that the amygdala plays an impor-
tant role in automatically processing stimuli (Morris, Öh-
man, & Dolan, 1998; Whalen et al., 1998), other research 
has shown that it is also influenced by top-down processes, 
such as self-regulation (Beauregard, Levesque, & Bourg-
ouin, 2001; Cunningham, Johnson, et al., 2004), verbal 
task demands (Hariri et al., 2002; Lieberman et al., 2007), 
and attention (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & Ungerleider, 
2006). For example, research has shown that participants 
given the goal to “increase” or “decrease” their emotional 
response can regulate their amygdala activation in response 
to emotional stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2004). 
This research demonstrating the top-down modulation of  
amygdala activity suggests that a fit between current process-
ing goals and evaluative aspects of  stimuli may lead to en-
hanced amygdala activity—what we call affective flexibility. In 
this context, a fit occurs when the valence of  a stimulus is 
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consistent with a processing goal. A recent study consistent 
with this idea found that participants who reported having 
more promotion-focused goals (sensitivity to gains) showed 
greater amygdala activation in response to increasingly pos-
itive stimuli, whereas participants who reported having 
more prevention-focused goals (sensitivity to losses) showed 
greater amygdala activation in response to increasingly nega-
tive stimuli (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2005). It is im-
portant to note that these relationships were observed when 
participants made explicit evaluative (e.g., good/bad) judg-
ments, but not when they made nonevaluative (abstract/
concrete) judgments. Similarly, patients with anxiety disor-
ders show heightened amygdala responses to threatening 
stimuli, compared with control participants (Bishop, Dun-
can, & Lawrence, 2004). Although these studies were corre-
lational and therefore do not provide causal evidence, they 
suggest that goals may play a role in shaping the amygdala 
response to evaluative information. 
In the present study, we manipulated processing goals 
to test the flexibility of  amygdala processing. Specifically, 
during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
participants were given three different processing goals 
that involved rating famous people. In the attitude con-
dition, participants used a bivalent scale to indicate their 
overall attitude toward each name. In the other two con-
ditions, participants provided univalent evaluative ratings; 
they rated only the positive aspects of  each name (i.e., 
“how positive is your response ignoring anything nega-
tive?”; scale from none to very good) in the positive condition, 
and they rated only the negative aspects (scale from none 
to very bad) in the negative condition. Thus, in the attitude 
condition, both positive and negative aspects of  each name 
were relevant to the processing goal, whereas in the pos-
itive and negative conditions, only positive or only nega-
tive aspects of  each name, respectively, were relevant. To 
the extent that the amygdala is engaged in processing as-
pects of  stimuli that fit the current processing goal, stim-
ulus extremity should be associated with activation when 
overall attitudes are rated (i.e., more extreme positive and 
negative names were expected to be associated with greater 
amygdala activation), whereas positive or negative stimuli, 
respectively, should be associated with enhanced amygdala 
activation when only positive or only negative aspects of  
the stimuli are rated (e.g., in the positive condition, names 
rated as more positive were expected to be associated with 
greater amygdala activation). 
Method
Participants
Sixteen right-handed participants (12 females, 4 males; 
mean age = 22.8 years) provided informed consent and 
were paid $50 for completing the study. Two participants 
were excluded because of  head motion greater than 2 mm 
in any direction, and 2 participants were excluded for 
knowing less than 75% of  the names. Twelve participants 
remained for analyses. 
Procedure
Participants completed eight functional runs, each con-
sisting of  three 12-trial blocks. On each trial, participants 
provided one of  three types of  evaluative judgments about 
a famous name. On attitude trials, participants evalu-
ated each name on a 4-point scale from strongly negative to 
strongly positive. On negative trials, participants evaluated 
only negative aspects of  the name, using a 4-point scale 
from none to very bad. On positive trials, participants eval-
uated only positive aspects of  the name, using a 4-point 
scale from none to very good. To help create and maintain 
evaluative goals, we grouped the trials so that the same 
evaluative judgment was required for all faces within each 
block. Each of  96 names (e.g., Adolph Hitler, Paris Hilton, 
Mother Teresa, George Clooney) was rated once in each 
condition. 
Before each block, a direction screen was presented for 
4 s to inform participants of  the evaluative judgment re-
quired for the following 12 trials. The direction screen was 
followed by a fixation cross for 4 s. Then, each name ap-
peared for 2 s, during which time participants made a re-
sponse with a four-button response box placed in their right 
hand. To allow for the estimation of  the event-related he-
modynamic signal, we presented a 2-s, 4-s, or 6-s fixation 
cross after each name; the duration of  the cross was pseu-
dorandomly determined. Following fMRI scanning, partic-
ipants completed a questionnaire on which they rated each 
of  the names on the dimensions of  positivity, negativity, 
and emotionality (i.e., how “emotional” the stimulus made 
them feel); the scales ranged from 1 (low) to 8 (high). Par-
ticipants also indicated names they did not know. 
fMRI Parameters
All imaging was conducted with a Siemens 3-T scanner. 
For whole-brain functional coverage, 32 axial slices (slice 
thickness = 3.5 mm, 0.5-mm skip) were prescribed paral-
lel to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line. 
Functional images were acquired using a single-shot gradi-
ent echo-planar pulse sequence (echo time = 25 ms, repeti-
tion time = 2 s, in-plane resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 mm, matrix 
size: 64 × 64, field of  view = 224 mm). 
fMRI Preprocessing and Analysis
Data were prepared for analysis using FSL (University of  
Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom) and SPM5 (Wellcome 
Department of  Cognitive Neurology, London, United King-
dom). Data were first corrected for slice-acquisition time, 
motion, and high-frequency noise using FSL default set-
tings. Data were then transformed to conform to the default 
EPI Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain interpo-
lated to 3 × 3 × 3 mm and were smoothed using an 8-mm 
full-width/half-maximum kernel in SPM5. Because we em-
ployed a blocked event-related design, a high-pass filter of  
160 s was used to retain meaningful signal. 
Data were analyzed using the general lin-
ear model as implemented in SPM5. In each analy-
sis, a series of  regressors was constructed to examine 
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blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) brain activ-
ity for each of  the trial types. The BOLD signal was mod-
eled as a function of  a canonical hemodynamic response 
function. For amygdala analyses, an anatomical mask was 
created, and significant voxels were defined as those ex-
ceeding a statistical threshold of  p < .05 (small-volume cor-
rected, with 10 contiguous voxels). For whole-brain anal-
yses, significant voxels were defined as those exceeding a 
statistical threshold of  p < .001 (uncorrected, with 10 con-
tiguous voxels). A statistical threshold of  p < .05 (uncor-
rected) was used to explore data from regions of  interest 
extracted from other analyses. 
Results
Rather than separating our data according to names 
rated as more positive than negative and names rated as 
more negative than positive, we conducted a series of  re-
gression analyses in which the continuous postscan rat-
ings were regressed against fMRI data to test for linear 
and nonlinear trends. The mean ratings for negativity (M = 
3.61, SD = 2.32) and positivity (M = 4.07, SD = 2.10) were 
similar, as were the correlations between ratings of  positiv-
ity and emotionality (r = .18) and ratings of  negativity and 
emotionality (r = .21; see Table 1). 
To examine the relation between postscan attitude rat-
ings and amygdala activity, we computed valence (V) 
scores from the postscan ratings of  each name by subtract-
ing each participant’s negativity rating from his or her pos-
itivity rating; higher scores represented more positive over-
all evaluations. BOLD activity for each participant and 
each trial was then predicted as a function of  V and V2 (the 
quadratic term). Because V was zero-centered, V2 repre-
sented the extremity of  the ratings of  positivity or negativ-
ity (i.e., highly negative and highly positive stimuli would 
both receive a high score). Rated emotionality was used as 
a covariate to ensure that the effect of  valence could not 
be attributed to generalized emotionality. Because values 
of  V close to zero could reflect either no valence or a mix 
of  positivity and negativity, we included an index of  am-
bivalence (having both positive and negative responses; 
Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) as a covariate.1 Un-
known names were modeled using separate regressors, so 
the reported analyses are based on known names (91% on 
average). To test for differences between experimental con-
ditions, we modeled each of  these parameters separately 
for each condition. 
Affective Flexibility in the Amygdala
Analyses of  amygdala activation were conducted using 
an anatomical mask generated in MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 
2000). Results were consistent with recent research linking 
stimulus intensity to amygdala activity; an overall effect of  
extremity (V2) was found bilaterally—right amygdala: t(11) 
= 5.76, p < .0001, prep > .99; left amygdala: t(11) = 5.31, p 
< .0001, prep > .99 (see Figure 1, top panel). This effect was 
not moderated by experimental condition, F(2, 22) = 0.70, 
p = .51, prep = .50, and was significant in each condition (ps 
< .05, preps > .88). There was no main effect of  valence on 
amygdala activity, t(11) = 0.11, p = .91, prep = .17. 
To examine whether amygdala activity was flexibly re-
lated to stimulus aspects that fit the current processing 
goal, we analyzed the valence-by-condition interaction. 
The results were consistent with the idea of  affective flex-
ibility; the effect of  valence on amygdala activity differed 
across experimental conditions—right amygdala: F(2, 22) 
= 11.07, p < .001, prep = .99; left amygdala: F(2, 22) = 9.44, 
p < .001, prep = .99 (see Figure 1, bottom panel). To be con-
servative in identifying regions of  the amygdala engaged 
in processing the motivational relevance of  stimuli, we de-
composed these effects by extracting the overlapping signif-
icant voxels from the preceding analyses of  the effects of  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Postscan Ratings
                                                                       Correlations
                                   among ratings
Rating                       Mean   SD   Minimum   Maximum   Positivity    Negativity
Measured variables
   Positivity  4.07  2.10  1.00  7.92
   Negativity  3.61  2.32  1.00  8.00  –.69
   Emotionality  3.83  1.85  1.08  7.67    .18  .21
Calculated variables
   Valence (V)  0.46  4.06  –7.00  6.92
   Ambivalence  0.75  4.05  –5.17  9.17
The calculated variables are linear transformations of the positivity and negativity ratings.
1. Ambivalence was computed for each stimulus for each participant using standard equations. These equations take into consideration both the conflict 
between positive and negative information (C, the minimum of  the two ratings for a given stimulus) and the strength of  the dominant response (D, the 
maximum of  the two ratings). Because C contributes more to ambivalence than D and is in the opposite direction, ambivalence was computed as 3C − 
D (see Thompson et al., 1995). 
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valence and extremity. Analysis of  these voxels revealed a 
significant relation between valence and amygdala activity 
in the positive condition (M = 0.05), t(11) = 2.06, p < .05, 
prep = .91, and the negative condition (M = −0.06), t(11) 
= −2.36, p < .05, prep = .93, but not in the attitude condi-
tion (M = 0.01), t(11) = 0.09, p = .46, prep = .53. The effect 
of  valence was reversed for the positive and negative condi-
tions; in each case, the most amygdala activity was found 
for stimulus aspects that fit the current processing goal. 
This pattern implicates the amygdala in tracking the fit 
between processing goals and evaluative aspects of  stim-
uli within the environment. To further elucidate these ef-
fects, we used the beta weights generated for V and V2 in 
the previous analysis to estimate expected amygdala activ-
ity at each level of  valence for each experimental condi-
tion (see Figure 2). Results for the attitude condition repli-
cated previous work: Amygdala activity increased for both 
increasingly positive and increasingly negative names. Al-
though there was evidence of  affective flexibility for both 
the positive and the negative conditions, the pattern of  data 
suggested a negativity bias (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), 
in which negative information was weighted more heavily 
than positive information.2 Specifically, in the negative 
condition, greater activity was found for increasingly neg-
ative names, and almost no activity was found for positive 
names. In contrast, in the positive condition, activity was 
found for both positive and negative names (though the ac-
tivity in response to negative names was less than in the 
negative and attitude conditions).3
Separating Positive and Negative Aspects
Recent models of  evaluation suggest that the processing 
of  valence can be subdivided into the processing of  positiv-
ity and negativity (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). The previ-
ous analysis suggests that affective flexibility may be asym-
metric, such that the effect of  the fit between valence and 
processing goal on amygdala activity is more pronounced 
for positive than for negative information. To provide a 
more direct test of  this possibility, we analyzed the data by 
estimating separate parameters for positive and negative as-
pects of  each name. Specifically, we modeled BOLD ac-
tivity as a function of  postscan positivity ratings, postscan 
negativity ratings, the positivity-by-negativity interaction, 
and emotionality. For the regression analyses, the positivity 
Figure 1. Significant activations in the amygdala region of  interest. The planes from which these coronal maps were taken are shown in 
the illustrations on the right. The maps on the top show areas exhibiting a significant overall effect of  stimulus extremity (V2), and the 
maps on the bottom show areas exhibiting a significant interaction of  valence and condition. 
2. The measures in Table 1 indicate that it is unlikely that reported effects can be attributed to differences in extremity of  the stimuli. Further, we analyzed 
the data using simultaneous regression analysis with ratings as continuous variables, and this approach also makes it unlikely for the significant results 
obtained to be due to differences in extremity. 
3. Although we report direct evidence for this asymmetry in the next section, initial evidence for a negativity bias can be found by comparing predicted 
activity in the positive and negative conditions with predicted activity in the attitude condition. Whereas the difference between the predicted activity 
in response to positive stimuli in the negative condition and in the attitude condition was significant, t(11) = 2.27, p < .05, prep = .88, there was no dif-
ference between predicted activity in response to negative stimuli in the positive condition and in the attitude condition, t(11) = 0.79, p = .45, prep = .54. 
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and negativity ratings were centered to allow for a mean-
ingful interaction term. To extract voxels for the second-
level analysis, we generated from the previous analyses a 
mask that contained the significant voxels for both the ex-
tremity and the fit effects. By analyzing only these voxels, 
we were able to make direct comparisons between the two 
sets of  analyses. 
Results were consistent with the idea of  affective flex-
ibility. There was a significant interaction between scan-
ning condition (positive or negative) and stimulus va-
lence (postscan ratings of  positivity or negativity), F(1, 
11) = 9.67, p < .01, prep = .95 (see Figure 3). More pos-
itively rated names were associated with more amygdala 
activity in the positive condition and less amygdala ac-
tivity in the negative condition. Further, more negatively 
rated names were associated with greater amygdala activ-
ity in the negative condition, but were unrelated to amyg-
dala activity in the positive condition. The graph in Fig-
ure 3 further illustrates the heightened amygdala activity 
in response to positive stimuli in the positive condition 
and the offset of  the extremity effect (V2) in the negative 
condition. In other words, the effects illustrated in Fig-
ure 3 can be understood as modulations of  the extrem-
ity effect, in which positivity and negativity are both asso-
ciated with increased amygdala activity. When there was 
a fit between stimulus valence and task, the extremity ef-
fect was enhanced (i.e., positive beta weights). However, 
when there was a mismatch, the extremity effect was not 
altered for negative stimuli in the positive condition, but 
was significantly reduced for positive stimuli in the nega-
tive condition (i.e., negative beta weight). Indeed, the lat-
ter reduction was sufficient to completely eliminate the 
extremity effect, as Figure 2 shows. Figure 3, like Figure 
2, shows evidence of  a negativity bias. The beta weights 
for negativity ratings suggest that although it is possible to 
increase the processing of  negative information, it may be 
more difficult to decrease the processing of  negative infor-
mation—even when the information is unrelated to cur-
rent goals. 
Affective Flexibility in Other Brain Regions
Whole-brain analyses were conducted to identify other 
regions showing affective flexibility in the form of  en-
hanced activity when there was a fit between valence and 
goals. For these analyses, we defined significant regions 
of  activity as those in which the regression parameter esti-
mates were larger for fit associations (e.g., relation between 
stimulus positivity and activity in the positive condition) 
than nonfit associations (e.g., relation between stimulus 
negativity and activity in the positive condition). In addi-
tion to identifying the amygdala, this analysis identified 
several other regions previously implicated in emotional or 
reward processing, such as right and left insula (Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Barrett & Wa-
ger, in press), t(11) = 4.16, p < .001, prep = .99, and t(11) = 
4.29, p < .001, prep = .99, respectively, and left nucleus ac-
cumbens (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001), t(11) 
= 3.73, p < .001, prep = .99. These results suggest that a 
widespread network of  brain regions is involved in process-
ing motivational relevance. 
Prefrontal Contributions to Affective Flexibility
We expected that not only regions typically associated 
with affective processing, but also regions associated with 
executive function and emotion regulation might be in-
volved in guiding affective flexibility. Having to selectively 
process a subset of  information to determine the affective 
Figure 2. Predicted bilateral amygdala activity as a function of  
stimulus valence and condition. Bilateral amygdala activity is 
plotted as the score predicted from the postscan valence (V) and 
quadratic valence (V2) beta terms as determined by ratings in 
each of  the three conditions. 
Figure 3. Beta weights associated with bilateral amygdala activ-
ity as a function of  independent postscan ratings of  positivity and 
negativity, graphed separately for the positive and negative condi-
tions during scanning. 
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connotations of  a stimulus may require deliberate attention 
and selective processing. Evidence for this would be found 
if  regions associated with executive function either had 
greater overall activity in the positive and negative condi-
tions than in the attitude condition or were shown to have 
greater connectivity with the amygdala in the positive and 
negative conditions than in the attitude condition. In ad-
dition, executive function may play a particularly active 
role when participants’ processing goal is to attend to ei-
ther positive or negative aspects of  stimuli and both pos-
itive and negative information are present (ambivalence). 
In these cases, the presence of  goal-relevant information 
would activate additional processing, and relevant infor-
mation would need to be foregrounded from goal-irrele-
vant (and in this case conflicting) information to make an 
appropriate judgment. 
Whole-brain analyses of  the main effect of  condition 
and the ambivalence-by-condition interaction provided 
evidence for both hypotheses. Right dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (PFC) differentiated conditions in the main-ef-
fects analysis, showing greater activation in the positive 
and negative conditions than in the attitude condition, 
t(11) = 3.02, p < .01, prep = .96 (MNI coordinates: 42, 33, 
42), although this effect was significant at a slightly more 
lenient threshold than used in the other analyses. This 
finding was bolstered by an independent components 
analysis that we used to examine connectivity (Calhoun, 
Adali, Pearlson, & Pekar, 2001). Of  the 25 components 
extracted, 2 contained both amygdala and prefrontal cor-
relations. The first suggested a network that also included 
both medial areas of  orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 5.92, p 
< .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: −3, 27, −24), and 
right lateral areas of  orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 4.25, p 
< .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 39, 39, −12), as well 
as a large area of  right rostrolateral PFC, t(11) = 3.68, p < 
.001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 24, 69, 12). The second 
network included right orbitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 4.61, 
p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 45, 57, −9); left or-
bitofrontal cortex, t(11) = 7.17, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI 
coordinates: −36, 54, −12); and anterior cingulate, t(11) 
= 4.35, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 12, 24, 27). 
We conducted a test of  differences in connectivity by re-
gressing the time courses of  these 2 components from the 
expected hemodynamic signals from the three conditions. 
These analyses indicated that both components were sig-
nificantly more present in the positive and negative con-
ditions than in the attitude condition—first component: 
t(11) = 2.29, p < .05, prep = .88; second component: t(11) 
= 3.47, p < .001, prep = .99. 
In addition, the condition-by-ambivalence interaction 
indicated that several regions were more associated with 
ambivalence in the positive and negative conditions than 
in the attitude condition. These regions included several 
areas associated with executive function and the fore-
grounding or backgrounding of  information (Cunning-
ham & Zelazo, 2007; Miller, 2000), such as ventrolateral 
PFC, t(11) = 5.14, p < .001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 
−36, 27, −18), and rostrolateral PFC, t(11) = 4.75, p < 
.001, prep = .99 (MNI coordinates: 24, 66, 18). The acti-
vations in lateral PFC suggest that additional processing 
was required for ambivalent stimuli. A regression analy-
sis (repeated within subjects) revealed that more ambiv-
alent names were associated with longer in-scanner reac-
tion times (− = .15, p < .001, prep > .99). Taken together, 
these results suggest that a simple goal state was likely in-
sufficient for processing ambivalence in the positive and 
negative conditions, and that lateral PFC regions were re-
cruited to resolve the conflict in rendering an evaluation, 
perhaps by foregrounding relevant aspects of  stimuli over 
irrelevant aspects. 
Results of  the region-of-interest and whole-brain analy-
ses are summarized in Table 2. 
Discussion
The present study demonstrates a new degree of  pro-
cessing flexibility within the human amygdala. These data 
suggest that the amygdala may play a relatively flexible role 
in evaluation, processing stimulus aspects in accordance 
with current goals and motivations. Specifically, activity in 
the amygdala tracked the fit between experimentally ma-
nipulated evaluative goals and the valence of  target stimuli. 
The amygdala was most active when participants evalu-
ated (a) positive stimuli in the positive condition, (b) nega-
tive stimuli in the negative condition, and (c) both positive 
and negative stimuli in the attitude condition. Although 
the “default” mode of  amygdala activation may be to pro-
cess affective intensity or extremity (positive or negative in-
formation could be equally important)—which serves an 
important vigilance function (Davis & Whalen, 2001)—
these data suggest that the amygdala, in concert with other 
neural components of  evaluative processing, may track and 
process the fit between stimuli and situational demands. 
Although these data provide an important demonstra-
tion of  affective flexibility in the amygdala, it is important to 
consider the asymmetry in evaluative processing. Whereas 
the amygdala was relatively unresponsive to positive names 
in the negative condition (Figure 2 shows a nearly flat line 
of  amygdala activity for such names), some residual activa-
tion in the amygdala was observed for negative names in the 
positive condition. Further evidence of  this negativity bias 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) was ob-
tained from the analysis in which we separated the indepen-
dent positive and negative ratings of  each stimulus. Whereas 
the processing of  positive information was associated with 
increased amygdala activity in the positive condition and de-
creased amygdala activity in the negative condition (offset-
ting the extremity effect), processing negative information 
only increased amygdala activity in the negative condition. 
Compared with positive information, negative information 
may not have been as easily inhibited when it was task irrele-
vant. These results suggest an important constraint on the af-
fective flexibility of  the amygdala. 
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In addition, the current study provides insights into the 
processes of  emotional regulation. Although there were dif-
ferences in PFC activation and connectivity with the amyg-
dala between conditions, there was a stronger interaction be-
tween ambivalence and condition, which suggests that the 
shifts in affective processing (Ochsner & Gross, 2007) may 
result from PFC-mediated processes. PFC regions may 
maintain the goal and trigger processes when stimuli are too 
complex (ambivalent) for the current processing goal (i.e., in 
the positive and negative conditions). For ambivalent stim-
uli, the recruitment of  additional PFC-mediated control pro-
cesses may have been necessary to foreground relevant va-
lenced information so that an appropriate evaluation could 
be rendered (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). 
One possible interpretation of  these data is that the 
amygdala itself  filters information on the basis of  motiva-
tional significance. An alternative possibility is that top-
down attentional processes foreground motivationally rele-
vant information, which is then processed by the amygdala 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Pessoa et al., 2006). It is likely that 
such processes came into play in our task, as word mean-
ing needs to be extracted prior to affective processing, and 
different memories may contribute to different evaluations. 
Thus, the observed modulation may have come from the 
inputs to the amygdala, rather than from differences in pro-
cessing within the amygdala proper. According to this ac-
count, processing was not changed; rather, the afferents 
were altered. 
Table 2. Areas Exhibiting Significant Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) Activation
               t or F                                 MNI coordinates
Area                                                     BA         Hemisphere     statistic                   x                     y                    z         No. of voxels
Areas associated with valence extremity (collapsing across conditions): region-of-interest analysis
Amygdala  —  Right  5.76  21  0  –21  34
Amygdala  —  Left  5.31  –18  6  –15  15
Areas associated with valence extremity (collapsing across conditions): whole-brain analysis
Amygdala  —  Right  5.76  21  0  –21  32
Amygdala  —  Left  5.31  –18 6  –15  15
Anterior cingulate  32  Left  6.90  –3  42  9  90
Parahippocampal gyrus  20/30  Left  7.62  –30  –27  –21  56
Middle temporal gyrus  20  Left  6.67  –63  –18  –24  45
Inferior temporal gyrus  37  Left  7.40  –51  –57  –18  117
Inferior parietal gyrus  40  Left  9.60  –60  –45  45  165
Areas associated with a significant valence-by-condition effect (affective fit): region-of-interest analysis
Amygdala  —  Right  11.07 21  0  –12  26
Amygdala  —  Left  9.44  –24  –3  –15  40
Areas associated with a significant valence-by-condition effect (affective fit): whole-brain analysis
Amygdala  —  Right  4.46  21  0  –12  13
Amygdala  —  Left  4.29  –24  0  –15  28
Insula  48  Right  4.16  45  0  6  16
Insula  48  Left  4.78  –42  0  9  36
Precentral gyrus  6  Left  4.59  –36  –12  60  40
Precentral gyrus  6  Right  4.38  27  –12  66  16
Supramarginal gyrus  48  Right  4.57  63  –21  27  26
Areas exhibiting greater activity in the positive and negative conditions than in the attitude condition: whole-brain analysis
Lateral orbital frontal cortex (VLPFC)  47  Right  5.14  –36  27  –18  34
Superior frontal gyrus (RLPFC)  10  Left  4.75  24  66  18  49
Superior frontal gyrus  8  Left  5.88  3  30  63  167
Middle frontal gyrus  9  Right  4.74  –39  27  48  10
Angular gyrus  48  Left  4.86  51  –42  30  64
Angular gyrus  39  Right  4.18  –60  –54  36  43
Inferior occipital gyrus  19  Left  5.15  45  –72  –15  40
Calcarine fissure  17  —  3.83  0  –72  12  11
In the region-of-interest analyses (small-volume-corrected p < .05) and whole-brain analyses (p < .001), identified regions had to 
meet a threshold of activity in 10 or more contiguous voxels. Regions are identified by Brodmann’s areas (BA) and Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates (x, y, z). RLPFC 5 rostrolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC 5 ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
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It is becoming increasingly clear that evaluation is re-
markably complex and dependent on the integration of  
existing stimulus-based attitudes with current goals, mo-
tivations, and contextual demands (Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Although amyg-
dala processing has been shown to occur rapidly and un-
consciously, these data add to the growing evidence that 
goals may modulate amygdala activation to generate con-
textually appropriate and nuanced evaluations (Kim et al., 
2004). Although complex neural networks play an impor-
tant role in rendering an evaluation, we suggest that flex-
ibility may be a core operating characteristic of  specific 
components within these networks. Specifically, the amyg-
dala may respond flexibly to the valence and extremity of  
stimuli in a goal-congruent fashion, but process negativity 
in a less flexible fashion than positivity. This combination 
of  flexible and fixed processing may allow humans to solve 
new and old evaluative problems while successfully navi-
gating complex environments. 
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